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Abstract
In the context of  increasing legal emphasis on fairness for people with disability, this article analyses the
responsibilities and liabilities of  lawyers in relation to the recognition and identification of  client disability,
and specifically Asperger’s Syndrome, prior to a hearing. This article also analyses the judge’s responsibilities
when a party has Asperger’s Syndrome. Lord Justice Gillen’s seven points of  principle and practical guidance
for fair hearings when a party has a disability (Galo v Bombardier Aerospace UK)4 are used as a
framework to explore the art of  judging, or ‘judgecraft’.
But always in the attic of  my mind I dreamed of  a magical machine that would
soothe me and make me less different.5
Introduction
The formal identification of  what is termed ‘Asperger’s Syndrome’ occurred less than 80years ago; ‘Kanner’s classic paper (1943) outlined the behaviour pattern, present from
early in life, which he named “early infantile autism”.’6 Accounts already existed ‘of
individual children whose behaviour fitted the picture Kanner later described’ but Kanner
was the first to publish a description of  a series of  such cases.7 Asperger’s Syndrome is
named after the scientist who, a year after Kanner’s paper, published his own about a group
of  autistic children who were in the normal range of  intelligence.8 As noted in case law,
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Asperger’s Syndrome was first named in the International Classification of  Diseases (ICD-
10)9 in 1990.10
Though there is wide agreement that Asperger’s Syndrome is an autism spectrum
condition, there is debate as to whether it should exist as a separate diagnostic label. The
fifth edition of  the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders (DSM-V,
which replaced DSM-IV in May 2013) removed Asperger’s Syndrome as a separate
disorder and states:
Individuals with a well-established DSM-IV diagnosis of  autistic disorder,
Asperger’s disorder, or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified
should be given the diagnosis of  autism spectrum disorder.11
The definition of  Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in DSM-V includes:
Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple
contexts, for example: 1. Deficits in social–emotional reciprocity, ranging, for
example, from abnormal social approach and failure of  normal back-and-forth
conversation . . . Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding
relationships, ranging, for example, from difficulties adjusting behaviour to suit
various social contexts . . .
The DSM-V includes the new name of  Autism Spectrum Disorder to encompass four
previously separate disorders, namely autistic disorder (autism), Asperger’s Syndrome
disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder and pervasive developmental disorder not
otherwise specified. However, the ICD-10 retains the diagnostic code of  Asperger’s
Syndrome.12 It is possible that the next edition of  the ICD (ICD-11) will align the
revisions made to the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorders in the DSM-V.
The term Asperger’s Syndrome is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘High-
Functioning Autism Spectrum Condition’, the latter being a term used to describe a
person with autism with at least average IQ. Asperger’s Syndrome is an autism spectrum
condition (ASC). Hereinafter we will use ASC when we are referring collectively to the
range of  autism conditions on the spectrum. ASC gives rise to ‘a disability in social and
communication development, alongside unusually narrow interests (“obsessions”) and
repetitive behaviour’.13 There is no medical treatment available to cure the basic
impairments associated with ASC. The prevalence of  ASC in England is approximately
10 per 1000, though it is more commonly found in males, and adults ‘have enduring
problems with communication and social understanding’.14
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The Autism Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 and understanding of ASC in the
general public of Northern Ireland
The Autism Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 amended15 the Disability Discrimination Act
1995 (DDA) and removed any doubt that ASCs fall within the definition of  disability.
Using a large-scale general population survey (N=1204), Dillenburger and colleagues
(2013) investigated autism awareness, knowledge about autism and perceptions about
autism interventions in Northern Ireland. Findings revealed high levels of  autism
awareness. More than 80 per cent of  the sample were aware of  ASC. Additionally, more
than 60 per cent of  these respondents knew someone with ASC either in their own family,
circle of  friends or work colleagues. Overall, respondents demonstrated relatively
accurate knowledge of  both the difficulties and strengths faced by individuals with ASC.
However, the respondents’ perceptions of  interventions and service-provider
responsibilities were ‘vague and uncertain’.16
In another study based on 500 people from the Northern Irish general public (aged
16 and over), Stewart (2008) investigated what they knew about autism. Stewart’s study
found that the majority of  people had heard of  autism (87 per cent) and, of  these, 79 per
cent were aware about some of  the key aspects of  autism. However, of  the 500 people in
the study only 48 per cent had heard of  Asperger’s Syndrome. Moreover, many
respondents had misconceptions about autism. For example, ‘thinking that individuals
with autism swear inappropriately (48%), were intentionally rude (24%), unable to walk
(11%), are mostly children (55%), or had special abilities (62%)’.17
The Galo case and procedural (un)fairness
The Court of  Appeal decision in the case of  Galo v Bombardier Aerospace UK18 has placed
a spotlight on procedural fairness when a party to legal proceedings has a disability.
Mr Galo has Asperger’s Syndrome. He appealed the decision of  the Industrial Tribunal19
which dismissed his claim against his previous employers. In summary, Mr Galo was
suspended from work for alleged gross misconduct, namely throwing ‘an item of  work
equipment behind him’ and shouting at an occupational health doctor examining him.
Mr Galo launched a grievance against his employers alleging victimisation and
discrimination; his employers investigated and dismissed his grievance and, after a
disciplinary investigation and hearing, terminated his employment for gross misconduct.
He made a claim in the industrial tribunal for, amongst other things, unfair dismissal and
disability discrimination.
Prior to Mr Galo launching his claim, his employers obtained a medical report from a
clinical psychologist, Dr Lusty, which noted an earlier educational psychologist report
concluding Mr Galo had Asperger’s Syndrome and Dr Lusty herself  agreed with this
diagnosis. The most curious thing about the way the case was managed in the Industrial
Tribunal is that ‘no attempt appears to have been made to engage with or address his
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disability of  [Asperger’s Syndrome]’.20 Despite the claimant furnishing the court and the
parties with medical evidence that he was mentally unwell (in addition to having
Asperger’s Syndrome) and thus unable to comply with case management directions and
unfit to attend on the date of  the final hearing, the tribunal dismissed his claim in his
absence. The Court of  Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that Mr Galo had not benefited
from fair case management or a fair final hearing and referred his case ‘back for a hearing
before a differently constituted Tribunal who will doubtless take the steps outlined in this
judgment’.21
Giving judgment in the Court of  Appeal, Gillen LJ noted that ‘[f]or many years now
the courts in Northern Ireland have recognised the particular need to ensure fairness in
hearings where one or more parties suffers from a disability’22 and set out in six bullet
points (expanded below by the authors) that there is an increased emphasis on fairness
arising out of  the following.23
• The Human Rights Act 1998 including Article 6 of  the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), involving the right to a fair hearing,
and Article 14 of  the ECHR, placing a positive obligation on states to ensure
there is a benefit from anti-discrimination.
• The European Union Directive 2000/78/EC of  27 November 2000
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation with particular reference to Article 9(1).
• The UN Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities which reads
at Article 13:
1    States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons
with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through
the provision of  procedural and age appropriate accommodation,
in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect
participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings,
including at investigative and other preliminary stages.
2    In order to help to ensure effective access to justice for persons
with disabilities, States Parties shall promote appropriate training
for those working in the field of  administration of  justice . . .
• The DDA and the application of  the judicial acts exclusion – this legislation
protects from discrimination those who have a ‘disability’ as defined by the
Act and places duties on employers and public service providers to make
‘reasonable adjustments’. However, the general duty imposed by the DDA on
public bodies24 does not extend to ‘a judicial act (whether done by a court,
tribunal or other person)’ or ‘an act done on the instructions, or on behalf,
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of  a person acting in a judicial capacity’.25 Whilst the ‘judicial function’ is
exempt from the prohibition on discrimination in the exercise of  public
functions, this exemption is likely to be limited to the core, adjudicative and
listing functions.26
• The European Union Charter on Fundamental Rights.27 The Charter sets
out fundamental rights and freedoms. It became legally binding when the
Treaty of  Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. The Charter
declares ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law’. Article 21 prohibits: ‘[a]ny
discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other
opinion, membership of  a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or
sexual orientation’. Article 26 states: ‘[t]he Union recognises and respects the
right of  persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure
their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in
the life of  the community’. 
• The Equality Act 2010 – the Equality Act 2010 replaced the DDA in
England and Wales. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland has
stated that ‘[t]he need for reform of  the equality legislation in Northern
Ireland has been heightened by developments in Great Britain’.28
In Galo, Gillen LJ set out seven considerations, a mix of  principles and guidelines,29 for
procedural fairness at hearings when a party has a disability:
(1) the entitlement to a fair hearing including to participate effectively;
(2) the impact of  the mental health disability on the litigant;
(3) the Equal Treatment Bench Book (ETBB);
(4) how a person with a particular disability might present;
(5) the benefit of  a McKenzie Friend/an independent mental health advocate;
(6) a modified approach, if  necessary, to obtaining evidence; and
(7) an early ‘ground rules hearing’;
These seven points will be considered in detail below from page 45 onwards. Unless a
court is aware of  a party’s disability, it is obviously not in a position to take it into account.
Thus, before considering the art of  judging, or ‘judgecraft’, under these seven headings,
we first consider what, if  any, responsibility a lawyer has to recognise and respond to
disability in a client facing a court hearing and, specifically, to recognise the ‘hidden
disability’ that is Asperger’s Syndrome.
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A lawyer’s responsibility to identify a client’s disability
There is no explicit legal obligation on a lawyer to diagnose their client’s disability (if  any),
nor is it suggested that there should be; lawyers are not medical practitioners qualified to
diagnose physical and mental conditions. It is not part of  the lawyer’s role to make a
medical diagnosis just as it was not part of  the police’s role to diagnose autism in the case
of  ZH v The Commissioner of  Police for the Metropolis.30
In ZH the police responded to a call to attend a public swimming pool where an autistic
and epileptic boy (ZH) was ‘stuck’ in the swimming pool. ZH (by his litigation friend)
successfully sued the police for their use of  restraint and detention techniques which were
found by the court to be in breach of  the DDA31 which made it unlawful for a public
authority to discriminate against a disabled person in carrying out its public functions. ZH
was awarded damages for assault and false imprisonment and, under the Human Rights Act
1998, for breach of  Article 3 of  the ECHR: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ The police authority appealed and lost.
Delivering judgment in the Court of  Appeal, the Master of  the Rolls said:
I accept that police officers are not required to make medical diagnoses. They are
not doctors. But the important feature of  the present case is that, even before
they restrained ZH, they knew that he was autistic and epileptic. They knew (or
ought to have known) that autistic persons are vulnerable and have limited
understanding.32
The general principle at the heart of  the ZH case is that a professional’s actions carried
out in pursuance of  the responsibilities of  their role will be judged by what they knew or
ought to have known at the time.
Just as it is a judge’s professional responsibility to promote the proper administration
of  justice,33 lawyers also have a professional responsibility to promote the proper
administration of  justice: a barrister has ‘an over-riding duty to the court to ensure the
proper administration of  justice’;34 and a solicitor ‘shall never forget that they should put
first not their right to compensation for their services, but the interests of  their clients
and the exigencies of  the administration of  justice’.35 One aspect of  the proper
administration of  justice is:
. . . the necessity to remove barriers to inclusion that create disadvantage and
discrimination. To that extent, courts must take all steps possible to ensure that
people with a learning disability are able to actively participate in decisions
affecting their lives. They must be supported in ways that take account of  their
individual needs and to help them to be as independent as possible.36
This obligation to remove barriers undoubtedly applies to all forms of  disability, not just
learning disability, which might impair effective participation. Thus it is submitted that if
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a lawyer knows their client has a disability and that disability is likely to create a barrier to
their effective participation at a hearing, the lawyer, with their client’s informed consent,
should disclose this to the court so that adjustments may be made and justice may be
administered properly. It is the lawyer’s duty not only to their client but also to the proper
administration of  justice.
However, if  a lawyer does not know that their client has a disability, it is less clear when
it can be said that they ought to know. It might be argued that lawyers have no responsibility
in this regard in the absence of  being told expressly by a client that they have a disability.
However, this would be an unattractive argument and unworkable in practice since there
are numerous reasons why a client might not disclose a disability to their lawyer: they
might not know they have a disability; they might have been told by others they have a
disability but they consider that they do not have a disability;37 they might feel
embarrassed that they have a disability; they might fear that a disability will count against
them and so on. For these reasons the responsibility cannot rest solely with a client to
inform their lawyer of  their disability.
In the absence of  a client revealing to the lawyer that they have a disability, and in the
absence of  a clear outward physical sign, it might be argued that it is unreasonable to say
a lawyer ought to know; in general, psychological vulnerability often goes unidentified. In
2010 Gudjonsson wrote about the identification of  psychological vulnerability in suspects
at the police station:
. . . in the majority of  cases vulnerabilities [of  witnesses and suspects who are
interviewed at police stations] are not identified, and even if  identified, this
information is not always acted upon in terms of  service provisions. This
problem needs to be urgently addressed and some reliable form of  screening
needs to be developed, implemented, and acted upon.38
Research in Northern Ireland by Bunting et al, looking at the criminal justice system,
reached similar conclusions:
Vulnerable witnesses, especially adults with learning disabilities, mental health
problems etc. are not always being identified early enough in the process. Ideally
this identification would be made by the PSNI [Police Service of  Northern
Ireland] on first contact with victims and witnesses; however this does not always
happen; vulnerable adults may not be identified at all or only identified late in the
process.39
In 2015 a joint inspectorate report was published after a review of  Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) files in England and Wales. The report noted with concern that ‘in 41 of  the
195 case files (21 percent) where vulnerable victims and witnesses were involved, the police
did not identify their vulnerability and did not manage the associated risk through the court
process. There were 5 cases where the CPS neither identified nor managed the risk.’40
The rates of  diagnosis of  ASC have increased since 1980, which raises the issue of
whether some children who previously had other diagnoses are now being diagnosed with
autism. A number of  studies have found evidence to support this. For instance, in their
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study based on 38 adults, Bishop, Whitehouse, Watt and Line41 found that the majority
of  adults with ASC had previously been diagnosed with pragmatic language impairments
during their childhood. Therefore, some children who today would fulfil the diagnostic
criteria for ASC would have received alternative diagnoses in the past in childhood, such
as developmental language disorders.
A study based on a small sample of  professionals in, or associated with, the criminal
justice system suggests that practitioners would like more training to determine what
special adjustments may be needed for those with communication needs. The study also
concluded that guidance42 for advocates on identifying vulnerability does not appear to
be reflected in practice.43
Another survey of  a small number of  legal practitioners and members of  the autism
community suggested that:
. . . the variation in legal practitioners’ experience of  [ASC] is dependent on a
number of  factors: 1) personal experience of  the condition; 2) having conducted
their own research or being ‘self-taught’ in the area of  [ASC]; 3) previous
experience of  dealing with or representing [ASC] individuals; and 4) training – of
which there was a lack of  and a strong demand for by all groups.44
Findings from research, far from being a reason to set the bar very low for lawyers,
emphasise the need for lawyers to become adept at asking appropriate questions and at
identifying signs of  possible psychological disability in their clients.
Whether a lawyer ought to know of  a client’s disability will be fact-specific and will
depend on whether or not there are indicators. Lawyers need to be aware of  indicators of
disability, always keep the possibility of  client vulnerability under review,45 and proactively
seek information from the client. Advice is available online from The Advocate’s
Gateway, a website providing free access to practical, evidence-based guidance on
vulnerable witnesses and defendants in the form of  toolkits. Toolkit 10 on The
Advocate’s Gateway46 includes a list of  questions that could be asked which ‘are more
likely to elicit useful and reliable information compared to questions such as “Do you
have a learning disability?” or “Are you disabled?’’’47 Where a disability is suspected, the
lawyer’s role is not to diagnose but to refer the client for diagnostic assessment. If  the
suspected disability or condition is an ASC such as Asperger’s Syndrome, one leading
expert advises that the ‘diagnostic assessment for Asperger’s [S]yndrome’ needs ‘to
include an evaluation of  the person’s ability to understand and express emotions, not only
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to confirm the diagnosis, but also to screen for the possibility of  an additional mood
disorder, especially anxiety or depression’.48
Identifying Asperger’s Syndrome in a client
Asperger’s Syndrome is not necessarily obvious because ‘[y]ou cannot tell that someone
has Asperger’s Syndrome by looking at them. Because of  this Asperger’s Syndrome is
sometimes called a hidden disability.’49 There has been no research to date which has
empirically investigated the effectiveness or utility of  screening defendants or witnesses
for ASC including Asperger’s Syndrome. According to the National Autistic Society,
autism ‘is much more common than many people think. There are around 700,000
[children and adults] in the UK living with autism.’50
Appellate criminal case law51 provides examples of  defendants who have been on trial
and convicted, only subsequently to be diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome: R v Reynolds52
[2004]; R v Sultan53 [2008]; and R v Thompson54 [2014]. Suspects have been diagnosed after
arrest,55 albeit sometimes several years after arrest. Gary McKinnon fought his extradition
to the USA where the authorities sought to try him for gaining unauthorised access to 97
government computers between 1 February 2001 and 19 March 2002. He was officially
diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome on 23 August 2008 having been first arrested on
19 March 2002 by the Hi-Tech Crime Unit:56 ‘On 16 October 2012, the Home Secretary
decided not to extradite Mr McKinnon to the US on the basis of  his health.’57
In R v Hayes,58 Tom Hayes was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome on 28 April 2015,
less than one month before his trial began59 and over three years after he had first been
arrested. Mr Hayes’ diagnosis may not have come as a surprise to those who knew him or
to his former work colleagues, some of  whom nicknamed him ‘Rain Man’60 – after the
1988 film starring Dustin Hoffman, who played Raymond, an autistic savant – and ‘Kid
Asperger’s’.61
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Generally, lawyers are not trained to notice indicators of  ASC, though, arguably, on
account of  its prevalence, they should be. It is likely that some lawyers are missing the signs
of  possible ASC because they do not know what they are. There is no disability screening
tool available to them, let alone any specific ASC screening tool for lawyers to use. The
online toolkit designed specifically for advocates which gives guidance on identifying
vulnerability62 has not been empirically tested and awareness of  it may be poor.63
Another online source, published by the National Autistic Society, provides case
studies and practical guidance to criminal justice professionals including:
A person with autism will show some of  the following characteristics.
Social interaction
He or she may:
• appear to be indifferent to others or socially isolated
• be unable to read social cues
• behave in what may seem an inappropriate or odd manner
• appear to lack empathy
• avoid eye contact when under pressure.
Social communication
He or she may:
• have difficulty in understanding tone of  voice, intonation or facial expression
• make a literal interpretation of  figurative or metaphorical speech (for
example, the phrases ‘has the cat got your tongue’ or ‘he’d make mincemeat
of  you’ could be alarming to a person with autism)
• find it difficult to hold a two-way conversation
• become agitated in responses or come across as argumentative or stubborn
• come across as over-compliant, agreeing to things that are not true
• use formal, stilted or pedantic language
• have poor concentration and thus poor listening skills
• be honest to the extent of  bluntness or rudeness.64
. . . Many people with an autism spectrum disorder have difficulty processing
everyday sensory information such as sounds, sights and smells . . . Every
individual will be affected differently, and some will be oversensitive to sensory
stimulation while others will be under-sensitive and seek out sensory stimulation.
People who struggle to deal with all this sensory information are likely to become
stressed or anxious, and possibly feel physical pain.65
However, Maras et al noted that ‘just 20% of  solicitors and barristers [in the survey of
lawyers, clients with autism and family members] indicated that steps had been taken to
manage the sensory needs of  a person with AS[C] in court’.66
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Negligence, complaints and training
With the increased current emphasis on the rights of  those with disabilities to effectively
participate in hearings, lawyers may face claims of  negligence if  they knew of  the client’s
disability or ought to have known but failed to draw this to the attention of  the court.
However, liability would not be easy to establish; the client would have to prove, inter alia,
that the lawyer’s action/inaction caused an adverse outcome in the case. When the House
of  Lords in Hall v Simons abolished barristers’ immunity from negligence claims for
advocacy in court there was no opening of  the claims floodgates and it is likely that Lord
Steyn identified the reason:
. . . it will not be easy to establish negligence against a barrister. The courts can
be trusted to differentiate between errors of  judgment and true negligence. In
any event, a plaintiff  who claims that poor advocacy resulted in an unfavourable
outcome will face the very great obstacle of  showing that a better standard of
advocacy would have resulted in a more favourable outcome.67
Though the possibility of  a successful professional negligence claim by a client against
their lawyer for failing to identify their disability and/or draw it to the attention of  the
court may be remote, the possibility of  a successful complaint to a professional body for
the lawyer’s consequent failure to uphold the proper administration of  justice is less
remote. This is because proving a more favourable outcome to the proceedings is not
necessary for a complaint to be upheld; proving that the proceedings would have been
adjusted and, for example, less traumatic for the client could be sufficient. Additionally,
the lawyer may be liable under the DDA for failing to make reasonable adjustments in the
supply of  legal services to the client.
Lawyers’ awareness of  their own professional responsibilities in this regard could have
a positive effect on their behaviour such that they would be more likely to incorporate
disability awareness training into their professional development regime.
Parties with Asperger’s Syndrome and ‘judgecraft’ in light of Lord Justice Gillen’s
seven points of principle and guidance
There was no dispute in Galo that the claimant has Asperger’s Syndrome though it was
largely overlooked by the parties and the Tribunal with the result that the appeal was
successful and it was ordered that a freshly constituted Industrial Tribunal should hear the
matter again. The Tribunal will need to heed Lord Justice Gillen’s seven points of
principle and guidance for procedural fairness. We consider each in turn with particular
reference to the fair treatment of  a party with Asperger’s Syndrome.
One: ‘It is a fundamental right of a person with a disability to enjoy a fair hearing
and to have been able to participate effectively in the hearing.’
In order to comply with Article 6 of  the ECHR (the right to a fair trial), judges have
responsibilities to ensure that a vulnerable party can participate effectively in the hearing.
In SC v UK68 the European Court of  Human Rights required that proper allowance was
made for the difficulties of  a young defendant to ensure effective participation in the trial
process. In explaining what was meant by this, the European Court said:
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Given the sophistication of  modern legal systems, many adults of  normal
intelligence are unable fully to comprehend all the intricacies and exchanges
which occur in the courtroom: this is why the Convention, in Article 6(3)(c),
emphasises the importance of  the right to legal representation. However,
‘effective participation’ in this context presupposes that the accused has a broad
understanding of  the nature of  the trial process and of  what is at stake for him
or her, including the significance of  any penalty which may be imposed. It means
that he or she, if  necessary with the assistance of, for example, an interpreter,
lawyer, social worker or friend, should be able to understand the general thrust
of  what is said in court. The defendant should be able to follow what is said by
the prosecution witnesses and, if  represented, to explain to his own lawyers his
version of  events, point out any statements with which he disagrees and make
them aware of  any facts which should be put forward in his defence.69
Ultimately, responsibility rests with the judge to ensure that the stage is set for the
defendant to participate effectively. In R v Cox70 the judge was particularly proactive. The
appellant was 26 years old and had ‘major difficulties which included alcohol dependency,
personality disorder and a learning disability’. The extent and impact of  these disabilities
on his effective participation at the trial were at the heart of  the appeal. The Court of
Appeal concluded that the appellant had been convicted after a fair trial. Although no
intermediary had been available to facilitate communication, the judge took a number of
steps to give the defendant the opportunity to participate effectively. This included,
. . . short periods of  evidence, followed by twenty minute breaks to enable the
appellant to relax and his counsel to summarise the evidence for him and to take
further instructions. The evidence would be adduced by means of  very simply
phrased questions. Witnesses would be asked to express their answers in short
sentences. The tape-recordings of  the interview should be played, partly to
accustom the jury to the appellant’s patterns of  speech, and also to give the
clearest possible indication of  his defence to the charge.71
In Cox, the judge decided that he would have to be more interventionist than normal,
maintaining close control over questioning and intervening to avoid any possible
unfairness and to ensure that the appellant was not ‘unduly stressed’.72
Even if  the judge does not take an ‘active role’, proceedings overall may be fair if  what
is done overall is deemed ‘sufficient’. In R v Dixon,73 a young defendant with Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and a low IQ was tried with co-defendants for murder.
The Court of  Appeal of  England and Wales said: ‘We are not left with the impression that
the trial judge took an active role throughout the proceedings to ensure that this
vulnerable Appellant was actively participating in the proceedings.’74 However, the Court
of  Appeal thought ‘sufficient was done to enable effective participation’.75 In Dixon,
unlike Cox, the defendant had an intermediary throughout the trial and it may be this that
the Court of  Appeal thought neutralised the trial judge’s lack of  action.
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When a party has Asperger’s Syndrome, the steps that ought to be taken to promote
their effective participation will depend on the individual concerned. As one of  the leading
experts in autism, Dr Lorna Wing,76 is credited with saying: “Once you have met one
person with autism, you’ve met one person with autism.”77 This is crucial to recognise
because there is wide variation in the way that autism impacts on the individual and is
expressed. A judge should have no hard and fixed rules about what is required and should
approach the case management task with an open mind. What was effective with one party
with Asperger’s Syndrome might in fact be the opposite of  what is needed with another.
Two: ‘Courts need to focus on the impact of a mental health disability in the
conduct of litigation. Courts must recognise the fact that this may have influenced
the claimant’s ability to conduct proceedings in a rational manner.’
The Advocate’s Gateway has produced guidance in the form of  a toolkit covering general
principles regarding the questioning of  witnesses and defendants with a mental disorder.78
The toolkit stresses that ‘[i]nformation about an individual’s specific capabilities or
condition is essential and, if  not supplied, must be requested’.79 In the case of  a party with
Asperger’s Syndrome court proceedings may be the cause of  considerable stress.
When one considers the inevitable difficulties people with Asperger’s [S]yndrome
have with regard to social reasoning, empathy, conversation skills, a different
learning style and heightened sensory perception, they are clearly prone to
considerable stress, anxiety, frustration and emotional exhaustion.80
Numerous studies have identified the common co-morbidities which often occur in
persons with ASC, in particular, mood disorders such as depression and anxiety.81 Having
a diagnosis of  ASC may further exacerbate other issues in the individual’s life, for
instance, increasing their inability to cope and regulate their stress.82 This may be one
factor which contributes to the higher mortality rate found in individuals with ASC.83
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Paquette-Smith and colleagues84 investigated suicidality in 50 adults with Asperger’s
Syndrome. They dichotomised their sample into those who had attempted suicide (n=18)
and those who had not attempted suicide (n=32). Findings revealed that more than 35 per
cent of  individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome reported that they had attempted suicide in
the past, a figure which is much higher than the 4.6 per cent lifetime prevalence found in
the general population. Crucially, a clinical background of  depression and self-reported
more severe autism symptomatology were much more likely to be found in those who had
attempted suicide, therefore highlighting the importance of  the impact and contribution
of  co-morbidities in individuals with ASC and the need to recognise these 
co-morbidities.85
It follows that judges and lawyers ought to be aware that a party with Asperger’s
Syndrome may be less tolerant of  the inevitable stresses and strains of  litigation and, in
the most serious cases, there is a risk that they may take their own life. On the basis of
the advice of  a mental health professional, appropriate steps should be taken by the court
to comply with its safeguarding responsibilities to protect and promote the welfare of
vulnerable adults.86 This might include, for instance: adjourning the hearing so that the
party may recover their mental health; excusing the party from attending the hearing but
admitting their evidence in a written statement;87 inviting the parties to submit to the
Employment Tribunal in advance questions for the Employment Tribunal to put to the
other party at the separate hearing;88 supplying the cross-examination questions in
advance to the person with Asperger’s Syndrome so that they may answer them in writing
in their own time;89 or directing that the parties collaborate to plan pre-recorded
questioning of  the vulnerable person by a third party.90
Three: ‘Courts and Tribunals can, and regularly do, have regard to the general, non-
binding guidance and practical advice of the kind given in the Equal Treatment Bench
Book . . . It is clear therefore that courts and tribunals should pay particular attention
to the ETBB when the question of disability, including mental disability, arises.’
Gillen LJ noted in Galo that it was ‘a matter of  great concern that no reference appears
to have been made to the ETBB by the [Industrial Tribunal]’.91 Chapter 5 of  the ETBB,
‘Children and Vulnerable Adults’, notes that courts and tribunals are now required to
‘adopt a more flexible approach’92 and sets out numerous examples.
There is limited guidance in the ETBB on Asperger’s Syndrome.93 However, a toolkit
– Toolkit 3 Planning to Question Someone with an Autism Spectrum Disorder including Asperger’s
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Syndrome – has been available94 since October 2013.95 That toolkit recommends, for
example, that professionals questioning someone with an ASC:
. . . follow a logical, chronological order in questioning; use questions and
explanations that are short and simply phrased, unambiguous and ‘to the point’.
Be clear and precise in questioning; say what you mean. Do not expect the person
to understand what you are inferring/getting at. They may not know what you
know or need to know, unless you say so. Check your question for alternative
meanings before using it.96
In addition, The Advocate’s Gateway sets out guidance on ‘memory and sensory issues’
in Toolkit 15 Witnesses and Defendants with Autism.97
Four: ‘The ETBB provides helpful information for judges about the problems
experienced by [litigants with mental disabilities] in accessing the courts or tribunals
or participating in proceedings . . . Memory, communication skills and the
individual’s response to perceived aggression may all be affected . . . “Expert
evidence may be required”. . .’
Authorities from the Court of  Appeal of  England and Wales establish that expert
evidence should be available to the triers of  facts regarding how a defendant’s Asperger’s
Syndrome affects their presentation. Every person with Asperger’s Syndrome will present
in their own unique way but it is not uncommon for someone with the condition to avoid
eye contact, give long detailed answers to questions that others would have answered
more briefly,98 or fail to understand questions as intended (despite having a wide,
comprehensive and expressive vocabulary). This might result in the misinterpretation of
the presentation of  a person with autism as signs of  untrustworthiness, deliberate evasion
of  a direct question or playing for time when a tricky question is posed.
In 2014 in Thompson,99 the Court of  Appeal of  England and Wales found the verdicts
to be unsafe because the trial jury had not known that the defendant had Asperger’s
Syndrome (he was not diagnosed at the time) and expert evidence ‘would have been of
value to the jury in determining whether, on the one hand, the appellant was evading the
question or, on the other, that he was, as a result of  his unusual traits, reluctant to be
deflected from his pre-occupation with matters of  detail’.100 Given that individuals with
ASC are often impaired in their ability to appreciate the subjective experiences of  others,
the individual with ASC may therefore not exhibit any expression of  empathy or
intersubjective resonance. It is therefore important that fact-finders are aware that
apparent lack of  remorse or normal social functioning during courtroom proceedings is
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not actually reflective of  the person’s actual feelings of  remorse.101 This perceived lack
of  remorse displayed by the defendant with ASC is important to recognise as it can also
be particularly detrimental to them if  they are talking about their victim. In 2008 in R v
Sultan,102 the Court of  Appeal said that if  the jury had heard evidence of  the defendant’s
Asperger’s Syndrome, it ‘might have gone some way to explain to the jury why the
appellant was behaving so oddly at trial, such as reading a book during [the complainant’s]
evidence’.103
Theory of  mind (ToM) refers to a person’s ability to attribute mental states (e.g.
beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge) to themself  and others and also the ability
to understand that others have beliefs, desires, intentions and perspectives that are
different from their own.104 While impairment of  ToM is not a defining characteristic of
Asperger’s Syndrome, there is recent experimental evidence for such a deficit.105 As a
result, courts should be aware that a party may act in a certain way because they fail to
appreciate what others are likely to be thinking. Individuals with ASC may say things that
would be considered strange. 
They may also make awkward or inappropriate facial expressions. For instance, a
defendant with ASC may start laughing when talking about their victim during the court
proceedings. In many individuals with ASC, this outward expression may not reflect what
they are actually feeling or thinking. Freckelton details the case of  Brent Mack (who had
a diagnosis of  autism) who was charged with the murder of  his mother (State of  Western
Australia v Mack (2012)).106 A psychiatrist who was called by the prosecution team
reported that Mack had a tendency to focus on the way questions were asked rather than
their content. Justice McKechnie accepted that Mack’s behaviour was unusual and
considered that his odd and unusual presentation may cause him ‘prejudice before jurors’.
For instance, he had a ‘monotonous speech with an abnormal, robotic rhythm to it’.107
The language that defendants with ASC sometimes use can very often be
misinterpreted or misconstrued and can also be viewed as ‘eccentric, tangential and overly
formal’.108 They may also give sudden and unexpected verbal utterances or may suddenly
speak at increased volume. Individuals with ASC may also have difficulties with pragmatic
communication, that is difficultly with responding in appropriate ways in social discourse.
Such difficulties can be seen across a variety of  areas such as: the use of  gestures;
personal space; timing; topic selection; and difficulties with understanding non-literal
language; and also struggling to understand metaphors, irony, sarcasm or humour. Lastly,
they can have unusual or odd-sounding prosody. Speaking can sound very monotonous
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without variation in prosodic elements including speech rate and rhythm,
pitch/fundamental frequency, loudness, intensity, duration and pauses/silence.109
Asperger’s Syndrome does not create delusions, or amount to insanity. It does impair
communication and can impair understanding of  what others are thinking which may lead
to misunderstanding of  social signals by the person with Asperger’s Syndrome and
misunderstanding of  their behaviour by a tribunal or court. In the case of  Thompson,110
the Court of  Appeal said that the trial jury:
. . . was very much concerned with the issue of  interpretation of  the appellant’s
alleged conduct, partly admitted and partly denied. It was to that issue that the
expert evidence was primarily, although not exclusively, relevant. We cannot
conclude that the decisions made by the jury in 2007 would undoubtedly have
survived their consideration of  the new evidence.111
The verdicts were quashed.
Five: ‘The presence of a McKenzie Friend in civil or family proceedings or an
independent mental health advocate in a Tribunal should be encouraged in order to
help locate information, prompt as necessary during the questioning of witnesses and
provide the opportunity for brief discussion of issues as they arise. A more tolerant
approach to the use of a lay representative may assist.’
Gillen LJ’s words encouraging the use of  lay representatives are fully in keeping with the
Lord Chief  Justice’s Practice Note 3/2012: McKenzie Friends (Civil and Family Courts).
It applies to ‘civil and family proceedings in the Court of  Appeal (Civil Division), the
High Court of  Justice, the County Courts and the Family Proceedings Court in the
Magistrates’ Court. It does not apply in criminal cases.’
There is a presumption in favour of  permitting a personal litigant to have
reasonable assistance from a layperson, sometimes called a ‘McKenzie Friend’
who may provide moral support for personal litigants; take notes with the
permission of  the judge; help with case papers; quietly give advice on any aspect
of  the conduct of  the case which is being heard.112
This fifth point in Galo also recognises the potential benefit of  Independent Mental
Health Advocates (IMHAs). The World Health Organization in 2003 stated in its
publication ‘Mental Health Policy and Service Guidance Package Advocacy in Mental
Health’ that:
Advocacy is an important means of  raising awareness on mental health issues
and ensuring that mental health is on the national agenda of  governments.
Advocacy can lead to improvements in policy, legislation and service
development.113
When IMHAs are used in a court or tribunal, it is important to clarify their function and
expectations of  them in that particular case. Being a mental health ‘advocate’ is clearly not
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the same as being an advocate in court. Is the IMHA going to be advising, supporting or
both? Although not determinative, the view of  the person with mental health issues is
important. It is for the judge to decide and manage the role of  the IMHA in court. It is
noteworthy that for the Registered Intermediary pilot scheme for defendants, the mental
health charity MindWise provides volunteers as supporters for vulnerable defendants in
court,114 but they do not represent the defendant. Where a defendant is vulnerable on
account of  mental illness, a judge may order that they are accompanied during the trial by
a mental health support worker from MindWise.115
Six: ‘A modified approach may be necessary when seeking to obtain reliable evidence
from a person with mental health problems especially those who are mentally frail. It
is necessary to ascertain whether any communication difficulties are the result of
mental impairment . . .’
It has long been the case that in criminal proceedings certain witnesses (predominantly
vulnerable or intimidated witnesses) are eligible for modified procedures, namely ‘special
measures’. Special measures are set out in the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)
Order 1999:
• Article 11: the witness, while giving testimony or being sworn in court, is
prevented by means of  a screen or other arrangements from seeing the
accused;
• Article 12: the witness gives evidence by means of  live link – such a direction
may also provide for a specified person to accompany the witness while the
witness is giving evidence by live link;116
• Article 13: evidence is given in private (by excluding people from the
courtroom);
• Article 14: the wearing of  wigs or gowns is dispensed with during the
witness’s evidence;
• Article 15: the admission of  the witness’s video-recorded interview as
evidence in chief;
• Article 16: the admission of  video-recorded cross-examination or 
re-examination;
• Article 17: the examination of  the witness through an intermediary; and
• Article 18: the use of  aids to communication.
‘Vulnerable’117 witnesses are eligible for the special measures in Articles 11 to 18 (above)
and ‘intimidated’118 witnesses are eligible for the special measures in Articles 11 to 18
(above).119
Apart from Article 16 (pre-recorded cross-examination and re-examination), all of
these special measures are now available. Pre-recording of  cross-examination is a
relatively small change; it moves vulnerable witnesses’ evidence to before the trial and it
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is recorded so that it may be played later. This can drastically reduce the stress for
witnesses, who no longer have the prospect of  giving evidence hanging over them for
months. Under a pilot scheme at three Crown Courts in England, pre-recording of  cross-
examination and re-examination has been available for some vulnerable witnesses since
2013. The pilot scheme has been positively evaluated120 and pre-recording of  cross-
examination and re-examination will be rolled out ‘from 2017’.121 This is not radical. In
Australia, pre-recording of  cross-examination is commonplace and has been for years in
most states.122
In Northern Ireland intermediaries (Article 17) operate in criminal justice through
pilot schemes.123 The most recent Registered Intermediary review report found that the
Registered Intermediary role:
. . . continues to be essential in assisting vulnerable persons with significant
communication problems during their engagement with the criminal justice
process and is very well-regarded by all those who come into contact with it. As
the [Registered Intermediary] Scheme is progressing well at the investigative
stage and at Crown Court, it is recommended that consideration is given to
formally extending the Scheme to magistrates’ courts.124
There is no equivalent special measures legislation for family and civil courts in Northern
Ireland. However, the family courts in England and Wales may provide a blueprint; even
without special measures legislation, intermediaries have been ordered and used to
support the obtaining of  evidence from a person with mental frailty as this example
demonstrates:
A parent in care proceedings with mental health difficulties gave evidence in a
pre-recorded examination conducted by counsel in her chambers. All advocates
and the judge contributed to the planning of  topics to be covered and an
intermediary helped counsel plan her questions. The recording of  the witness’s
evidence was conducted by a professional third party who signed a
confidentiality agreement. Questioning, including breaks, took three-and-half
hours and an edited DVD lasting 90 minutes was admitted as evidence in the
family proceedings.125
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In England and Wales, intermediaries have proved in some family cases to be essential to
a fair hearing.126 In July 2016 the preliminary report of  Northern Ireland’s Review of
Family and Civil Justice made numerous recommendations for family justice. It remains
to be seen whether the report’s recommendations – including ‘pre-recording of  evidential
interviews, pre-court familiarisation, court supporters and special measures such as Live
Link and screens’ and Registered Intermediaries in the family justice system – will be
implemented.127 In October 2016, recommendations for reform in the civil courts
included the ‘use of  intermediaries . . . to support those with communication difficulties
in the civil and family courts’.128
Seven: ‘An early “ground rules hearing” is indicated in the ETBB at Chapter 5. Such
a hearing would involve a preliminary consideration of the procedure that the
tribunal or court will adopt, tailored to the particular circumstances of the litigant.’
The practice of  ground rules hearings129 was introduced through Registered
Intermediaries in England and Wales: ‘Many judges and advocates find [ground rules
hearings] “invaluable”; they provide a mechanism by which the judge can set the
parameters for the fair treatment of  vulnerable witnesses and defendants.’130 In Dixon,
‘[t]he absence of  a ground rules hearing prior to trial with the judge did not make the trial
unfair, although failure to take this step was regrettable’.131 However, this decision
predates the case of  Lubemba132 when the Court of  Appeal decision determined that a
ground rules hearing should take place when a case involves a vulnerable person unless
the circumstances are very exceptional.
Gillen LJ set out examples of  what might be considered at a ground rules hearing.
• The approach to questioning of  the claimant and to the method of  cross-
examination by him/her. Adaptations to questioning may be necessary to
facilitate the evidence of  a vulnerable person.
• How questioning is to be controlled by the Tribunal.
• The manner, tenor, tone, language and duration of  questioning appropriate to
the witness’s problems.
• Whether it is necessary for the Tribunal to obtain an expert report to identify
what steps are required in order to ensure a fair procedure tailored to the needs
of  the particular applicant.
• The applicant under a disability, if  a personal litigant, must have the procedures
of  the court fully explained to him and advised as to the availability of  pro bono
assistance/McKenzie Friends/voluntary sector help available.
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• Recognition must be given to the possibility that those with learning disabilities
need extra time even if  represented to ensure that matters are carefully
understood by them.
• Great care should be taken with the language and vocabulary that is utilised to
ensure that the directions given at the ground rules hearing are being fully
understood.
• As happened in the Rackham case [J W Rackham v NHS Professionals Ltd133],
consideration should be given to the need for respondent’s counsel to offer
cross-examination and questions in writing to assist the claimant with the
claimant being allowed some time to consult, if  represented, with his counsel.
These were deemed “reasonable adjustments”.
• The Tribunal must keep these adjustments needed under review.134
Gilllen LJ stressed the need for an ‘early’ ground rules hearing. In England and Wales the
Criminal Practice Directions recommend that: ‘Discussion before the day of  trial is
preferable to give advocates time to adapt their questions to the witness’s needs.’135
However, since the ground rules Gillen LJ has in mind are about much more than
questioning, they would need to be set as early as possible in the proceedings so that
interim hearings for case management, the communication between the court and the
party, disclosure procedure, orders in relation to obtaining expert evidence and support
for the party, and so on, are all adjusted where appropriate. If  the case proceeds to a final
hearing, at that stage there would need to be a further ground rules hearing with a specific
focus on the questioning of  the party with a disability.136
In England and Wales, recent Court of  Appeal decisions have established that
planning to question a vulnerable person is a collaborative exercise involving all the
advocates, the judge and the intermediary (if  there is one in the case). In 2014 the Court
of  Appeal in Lubemba endorsed the practice of  judges inviting advocates to provide their
questions in writing in advance so that they may be vetted by the judge, as well as by the
intermediary if  there is one.137
In 2015 the Court of  Appeal twice endorsed a collaborative approach to the planning
of  questions for a vulnerable witness. In R v FA,138 when setting ground rules prior to
taking fresh evidence from a vulnerable witness, the Court of  Appeal required the
defence to share their proposed questions with the intermediary so that they might
provide useful assistance. In R v RL,139 in advance of  the ground rules hearing, counsel
provided a list of  the questions which he proposed to ask two boys. The judge considered
the questions and the ‘intermediary was able to assist the court in relation to both boys
on questions such as whether they would have difficulty understanding questions asked in
particular terms’.140
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The ground rules approach, including advocates collaboratively planning the
questions with the assistance of  the intermediary where there is one, is good practice and
works even in the adversarial system because the intermediary is neutral and impartial. It
is suggested that, even if  there is no intermediary, advocates should write out their
questions in order more easily to check that they are expressed in a way that is suitable
for the vulnerable witness.
However, even when an intermediary is available, communication between the cross-
examiner and the defendant with Asperger’s Syndrome may not be fully coherent as this
specimen extract form R v Hayes demonstrates. ‘Q’ is the prosecutor’s question and ‘A’ is
Mr Hayes’ answer.141
Q. [Prosecution counsel is referring to the transcripts of  telephones calls made
at the bank.] You say: ‘Just give the cash desk a Mars Bar and they’ll set
whatever you want. They’re usually staffed by fat people.’ He says: ‘Hahaha,
brilliant.’ Now, you were – well, were you – was that a joke?
A. Which part?
Q. The bit about the cash desk with the Mars Bar?
A. I never gave the cash desk a Mars Bar.
Q. I’m not asking you that. I’m asking you was it a joke?
A. Yes.
Q. But – all right. If  you misunderstand my question, you must say so. Although
it was a joke; yes?
A. Yes. The bit at the end was a joke.
A vulnerable witness or defendant with ASC cannot always know when he
misunderstands the question, instead he may interpret it in a different way, not realising
that the questioner intended a different meaning. In these circumstances, it is the
responsibility of  the judge, with assistance from counsel and the intermediary, to
intervene when a question is ambiguous or when the answers indicates misunderstanding.
Ultimately, the judge must take all reasonable steps to ensure the witness is questioned in
a way that he or she can understand, particularly when being challenged. In 1894 in the
House of  Lords, Lord Herschell LC said in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67:
My Lords, I have always understood that if  you intended to impeach a witness
you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of  making any
explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule
of  professional practice in the conduct of  a case, but is essential to fair play and
fair dealing with witnesses. [71]
Echoing this in 2015, Lord Hughes in Director of  Public Prosecutions v Nelson (Antigua and
Barbuda) said: ‘The gravamen of  it is fairness. The witness, and in particular a defendant
witness, must not be deprived of  the opportunity to deal with a particular suggestion by
its being unspoken when it ought to be put directly.’142
The court or tribunal may wish to go one step further as was proposed in J W Rackham
v NHS Professionals Ltd (as cited in Galo): the claimant with Asperger’s Syndrome could be
supplied with the questions in writing in advance so that ‘he should take the questions
away and answer them in writing in his own time’.143
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In Northern Ireland the Registered Intermediaries Schemes Review of  2016
‘considered that it would be helpful to formally provide for [ground rules hearings] in the
statutory case management Regulations’.144 However, such regulations if  introduced
would apply only in criminal cases. Ground rules hearings in other cases would be a
matter for the judge under their general, inherent case management powers and
responsibilities.
In conclusion
In 2013 the Supreme Court said:
There is no doubt that one of  the virtues of  procedurally fair decision making is
that it is liable to result in better decisions, by ensuring that the decision maker
receives all relevant information and that it is properly tested . . . [J]ustice is
intuitively understood to require a procedure which pays due respect to persons
whose rights are significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of
administrative or judicial functions. Respect entails that such persons ought to be
able to participate in the procedure by which the decision is made, provided they
have something to say which is relevant to the decision to be taken.145
Judges and lawyers alike are charged with the responsibility of  upholding the proper
administration of  justice, including ensuring adjustments are in place to guarantee the fair
treatment and questioning of  those with disabilities. Lawyers may be found to be
professionally negligent, to have breached their code of  professional conduct and to have
fallen foul of  the DDA if  they do not alert the court to their client’s disability. This
requires lawyers not only to respond to a client’s disclosure of  disability but to actively
look out for indicators and refer the client for a diagnostic assessment where appropriate.
Awareness is key, but it is also a major challenge:
In responding to these difficulties [in identification of  vulnerable and intimidated
witnesses], the most significant challenge for the criminal justice system is to
make staff  aware of  the range of  vulnerabilities and to equip them with sufficient
understanding to recognise when more expert help and assistance needs to be
provided.146
Even if  awareness is achieved, there is another possibly even greater challenge; changing
behaviour towards those with a disability who are caught up within the adversarial model
of  fact-finding:
A commitment to reform is hampered as much by a misconceived fidelity to the
conventional way of  doing things and a reluctance to overly disturb familiar and
reified patterns as it is by concerns over the potential for injustice for accused
parties.147
In Galo, the Lord Justice Gillen’s seven points for procedural fairness set a framework for
behavioural change at hearings. Lawyers must accept that best practice now dictates a
collaborative approach to planning questions; this may seem alien at first in an adversarial
system. That judges are already becoming more interventionist for reasons of  efficiency
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has been noted.148 However, quite apart from efficiency, judges must take an active role
and intervene if  necessary to uphold the fundamental right of  people to access to justice.
Experience tells us that judges can and do regularly intervene in cross-examination in any
event in order to clarify evidence for the benefit of  the jury149 or for themselves, but, in
the case of  a person with a disability affecting communication, this intervention must be
nuanced and focused on the needs of  the person. The practice of  judges ‘vetting’
questions, requiring advocates to draft them in advance and consult with an expert
communication advisor such as an intermediary, or even provide the witness with the
questions in advance, may well take judges out of  their judgecraft comfort zone. So too,
perhaps, might the presumption in favour of  the active presence of  a lay representative
or supporter for a vulnerable party.
There are many sources of  advice available to judges and advocates in the form of
online guidance, most notably the ETBB and The Advocate’s Gateway. However,
knowledge is only as good as its application in practice. Training will be key. Lord Justice
Gillen’s judgment may prove to be a watershed. There is far more at stake than efficient
case management. Access to justice and the legitimacy of  the justice system are at risk.
The opposite of  procedural fairness in court is procedural discrimination in court.
Discrimination is an insidious practice. Discriminatory law undermines the rule
of  law because it is the antithesis of  fairness. It brings the law into disrepute. It
breeds resentment. It fosters an inequality of  outlook which is demeaning alike
to those unfairly benefited and those unfairly prejudiced.150
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